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Ships with Tracking Number! Buy with confidence, excellent customer service!. Seller Inventory n. Kenneth Surin. Publisher: Duke University Press Books , This specific ISBN edition is currently not available. View all copies of this ISBN edition:. Synopsis About this title The neoliberal project in the West has created an increasingly polarized and impoverished world, to the point that the vast majority of its citizens require liberation from their present socioeconomic circumstances.

From the Publisher : "Freedom Not Yet is a stunning, mature, and major work. Buy New Learn more about this copy. Other Popular Editions of the Same Title. Search for all books with this author and title. Customers who bought this item also bought. Stock Image. Published by Duke University Press. Nelson Jennings. Philosophical Theology and East-West Dialogue is a unique philosophical and theological analysis of certain key interactions between Eastern and Western thinkers. The book on the one hand contrasts general traits of Eastern, Buddhist thought and Western, Greek thought. However, in doing so it focuses on influential philosophers and theologians who manifest particular instances of wider issues.

The result is a careful examination of basic questions that offers both broad implications and concrete specificity in its approach. The book itself is an instance of East-West dialogue. Independently of each other both authors had previously engaged in serious cross-cultural studies. The Japanese Inagaki had researched Western science and philosophy, then written in Japanese comparative studies of Japanese thought. The North American Jennings had researched Japanese theology. They brought these backgrounds together, dialoguing with each other until the present study emerged.

Several creative Japanese thinkers, as well as important Westerners, are taken up. The study follows the lead of many Eastern impulses, but it also critically utilizes Western methods. Contemporary thinking on religious plurality is carefully examined. This new study is a must for those interested in philosophy and theology in general, and East-West interaction in particular.

Author: Michael Krausz. This book presents a fictional dialogue among four former college friends about Oneness and self-realization. News of the sudden death of a relative occasions their discussion. In previous works I have shown how science itself presupposes a critical realist ontology of the world as structured, differentiated and changing. But Parmenides also bequeathed another legacy to philosophy: the generation of a purely positive, complementing a purely actual, notion of reality, in what I am going to nominate the doctrine of ontological monovalence.

In this study I aim to revindicate negativity. Indeed, by the time we are through, I would like the reader to see the positive as a tiny, but important, ripple on the surface of a sea of negativity. Of these the most basic is real negation. Its primary meaning is real determinate absence or non-being i.

It may denote an absence, for example, from consciousness e. It connotes, inter alia, the hidden, the empty, the outside; desire, lack and need. It is real negation which, as we shall see, drives the Hegelian dialectic on, and it is our omissive critique of Hegel — his failure to sustain certain crucial distinctions and categories including in the end that of absence itself — that must drive the dialectic past and beyond him.

But real negation also connotes a process of mediating, distancing or absenting, i. In fact, as we shall see in the next chapter, it also signifies both process-in-product and product-in-process, so that it has a fourfold polysemy. How could one argue for the importance of real negation in, for example, science? Writings — books, research papers, experimental records — provide striking examples of it. Consider a book in a library.

It typically involves an absent and possibly dead author, an absent reception necessary for its presence in the library, and absences — spaces inside and in between sequences of marks — necessary for its intelligibility, its readability. Again experimental activity involves a real demediation of nature, preventing or absenting a state of affairs that would otherwise have occurred, so as to enable us to identify a generative mechanism or complex free from outside influence or with such interference held constant.

These may, if one likes, be taken as transcendental deductions of the presence of real negation in science, as conditions of its possibility. Real negation — think of empty spaces and absent x's where x stands in principle for any entity or feature. Of course what is absent or void at or from one level, region or perspective may be present at another.

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Transformative negation refers to the transformation of some thing, property or state of affairs. All cases of transformative negation are also cases of real negation but the converse is not the case. They all involve the cessation or absenting of a pre-existing entity or state. A special, and highly important, case of transformative negation is radical negation , which involves the auto-subversion, transformation or overcoming of a being or condition.

It is, of course, important in the human domain to distinguish negating processes from self-negating processes and self-negating from self-consciously negating processes. In Hegelian dialectic real, transformative, radical and determinate negation are all identified, resulting in a linear self-generating process, e.

If real negation is the most all-encompassing concept — extending from non-existence to metacritique — it is in transformative negation that the key to social dialectics lies. Indeed its schema is given by the transformational model of social activity which I have elaborated elsewhere and which will be suitably dialecticized and generalized in C2. Moreover, to the extent that we are dealing with a self-contained totality, all transformative negation, that is to say change, will tend to occur as a result of or take the form of radical negation s , as is arguably the case with global interdependence today.

This is not to deny that there is equally a case for a category of difference, e. In rather the same way the implicit supposition behind the doctrine of ontological monovalence is that any instance of real negation can be analysed in purely positive terms. Moreover, conceptually, it extends our ontology synchronically, irrespective of over what space-time span the indefinite synchronic is defined, so that it does not depend essentially upon process. I should also mention that in my exposition of what I now call real negation I confused the epistemological question of our criteria for the reality of absence with the ontological question of whether, for example, a thing is, quite independently of us, absent distanciated or non-existent , not there.

This was because I was tacitly thinking of non-being or more generally absence as necessarily involving depth, thus overlooking the simplest species, where it involves merely spatio-temporal distance. I shall make use of this term, and exploit this duality of meaning to connote the play of absence and presence, e. The chief result of ontological monovalence in mainstream philosophy is to erase the contingency of existential questions and to despatialize and detemporalize accounts of being. I shall be concerned with a variety of other modes of negation besides the ones I have already referred to.

One may be briefly mentioned here — subject negation. This refers primarily to a subject in the process of formation or dissolution e. As such it is clearly a variant of transformative negation, but I am going to extend its meaning to cover cases of non-transformative and non-trivially transformative real negation e. For it will be vital to my vindication of negativity that one can refer to absence, including non-existence; or, if one prefers to put it this way, that reference is not, contrary to the tradition from Plato to Frege, tied to positive existence.

This, I will show in C2. Non-being, within zero-level being, exists and is present everywhere. But my primary emphasis will be on the categories of real, transformative and radical negation of determinate and indeterminate kinds. One other preliminary matter before I pass on. Real determinate negation, absence or non-being, is not equivalent to Hegel's nothing, which entirely lacks determinacy, and any sort of depth.

Negativity, although it is the dynamic of Hegel's system and is in fact in the guise of contradiction greatly exaggerated by Hegel, is never developed or even simply retained — it is always cancelled and positivity restored. Seeing this is one of the merits of the young Hegelians. This is the moment of cosmology, of human geo-history, of personal biography , laborious or routinized work but also of joyful or idle play. This is at once the inner truth or pulse of things and the spot from which we must act, the axiological moment and if there is such metaphysical alethia.

I will postpone thematizing it until after a consideration of the very different Hegelian totality.

Freedom Not Yet: Liberation and the Next World Order (New Slant: Religion, Politics, Ontology)

But 3L is not the end of the matter. A fourth dimension 4D is required — for the critical realist totality is radically open. So we must return to practice. But this is not as a Nietzschean forgetting, but as active and reflexive engagement within the world in which we seek to achieve the unity of theory and practice in practice.

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Each level in this dialectic is preservative. This does not mean that every category at 2E is instantiated in some employment of a 3L category. Thus one can have dialectical connection without contradiction. We are left with non-identity, structure, negativity, finitude, essentially transformative change, holistic causality and phronesis at the end — in agency.

But, as we shall see, this historical sublation is not entirely preservative insofar as the moments of critical realism are affected by its dialectical deepening which is also a cross-fertilization. What is the characteristic error at 3L which stands to 2E and 1M as ontological monovalence and actualism respectively do? A relation aRb is internal if and only if a would not be what it is essentially unless it were related to b in the way that it is. Partiality is, of course, closely related to separability, which goes back to Aristotle's definition of substance taken up in crucial respects by Descartes, and in Aristotle derived perhaps ultimately from the Platonic theory of predication.

Let us just consider for a moment the thought-reality relationship.


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A philosophical ontology can be detotalizing or partial in at least four ways: 1 it can objectivize reality, e. Let us take a concrete case — that of Humean empiricism, dominant in mid-twentieth-century philosophical, scientific and social thought and present in that of Kant, Hegel and much post-Nietzschean post-structuralism. We can see its characteristic error at 1M to lie in anthropomorphizing and actualizing reality, at 2E that of positivizing and deprocessualizing de-spatio-temporalizing it, at 3L that of subjectivizing it and at 4D, in a characteristic and necessary inversion , 13 reifying and fetishizing that part of it which is the product of human practices.

One event follows another, but we can never observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined but never connected. These levels of deepening of critical realism should not be hypostatized. Furthermore, although, as in Hegel, it is the second moment — of negativity — that is the narrowly dialectical one, each of the others and the whole are implied in it as a system. Moreover, there are dialectics specific to each level. Thus the dialectics of 1M are typically dialectics of stratification and superstructure-formation or superstructuration, including emergence.

The typical dialectical figures here are what I shall call the dialectical comment , which I shall write as dc', and dialectical reason dr' , which I shall explicate in relation to Hegelian dialectic. Dialectical reason includes, in metacritical analysis, displaying the common or dialectical grounds dg' of apparently opposed but mutually complicit dialectical counterparts or contraries, as, I shall argue, in the Kantian opposition between knowledge and faith, or more generally between anthroporealism and transcendent — which I shall rigorously differentiate from transcendental — realism, or between empiricism and idealism.

Metacritical dialectical reason also isolates the duplicities and dialectical paralogisms generated by philosophies of identity including Hegel's own. At 2E the dialectics are characteristically dialectics of change, including interchange reversal , and transition. At 3L the characteristic figure is dialectical totality dt' , as when separated phenomena come to be seen as aspects of a unified or disunified whole.

Hermeneutics provides a good initial heuristic for understanding what it is to think in this dialectical mode. Montage, and pastiche generally, and entities like the British Working Class in February , provide examples of very different sorts of totalities. Relating it to the immediately preceding example, the dialectic here calls for the retotalization of the periphery in the mutual recognitions of identities-in-difference and unity-in-diversity, mediated therefore by mutual recognition of differential personal, social, local, etc.

This would involve a non-preservative dialectical sublation ds' of the pre-existing state of affairs. Sublations, generally, as species of determinate transformative negations, may be totally, essentially or partially preservative. Within and outside these categories further important discriminations may be made, e. Results include stand-offs, the mutual undoing of the contending parties , the preservation of the status quo ante, retrogression and many other outcomes besides sublation.


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  6. Nor does it make sense to talk of an Aufhebung in many types of what may be properly called dialectics — e. These involve polarities or more complex figures that may figure in sublations or generally outcomes, but, as part of the transcendental parameters of any conceivable social life, are not themselves sublatable, or so it would seem reasonable to suppose. Of course a dialectical outcome or result, of any of these characteristic modes, is only spatio-temporary; the potential starting point for a new round of real transformative negation. By the end of this chapter the very different topologies of the critical realist and Hegelian dialectics will become apparent.

    But it should perhaps be said here and now, if it is not already obvious, that, although I will show their connections, my 1M, 2E and 3L do not correspond to the Hegelian moments of understanding, dialectic or negative reason and speculative or positive reason shortly to be discussed.

    They encompass different types of dialectic, within each of which dialectical negativity has a role to play; and the movement or dialectic of critical realism as a whole which, of course, includes 4D , to be articulated fully in the chapters to come, traverses and envelops all these phases or levels. Nor do the moments of dialectical critical realism match the tetrapolity of analytical, dialectical, totalizing and practical reasoning.

    For a start, 4D consists not in practical reasoning but in reasonable practice — not the same thing at all. Moreover, critical realist dialectical reasoning comprises all these modes of reasoning and practice and their unity. In particular there is a dialectic of dialectical and analytical or formal reasoning in the course of which discourse moves in and out of the domain of formal reasoning, be it of a deductive or, for example, inductive type, in which meanings and values remain fixed or stable in their indeterminacy , which is of great importance in science, philosophy and everyday life.

    Furthermore, dialectical critical realism is dialogical — discursive, inter-subjective through and through.

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    There is one other preliminary matter that should be dealt with here before I turn to Hegelian dialectic. It may be contended that critical realism is, or began as, a philosophy of — and for — science, even if it is conceded that it is not a scientistic philosophy. Let us consider the last objection first. There is an important grain of truth here. There is indeed a big difference between science and everyday knowledge, which the philosophical tradition has — at least in its post-Lockian period — tended to conflate or otherwise obscure, the significance of which I will bring out anon.

    At 2M, 3L and 4D the wider social context is more important, though we should never underestimate the power buried in the human psyche-soma. Correspondingly, transposing philosophical theses of an epistemological kind into their presuppositions about and implications for science can be extraordinarily illuminating. In particular it affects a concretization itself a dialectical development of these, which makes it easier to identify exactly what their insights, aporiai, tensions and effects are. A parallel recasting of ethical positions and arguments into social theoretic positions can be equally illuminating.

    To turn to the first objection now, it is the case that the transcendental arguments used to establish critical realism were in the first instance thrown up by existing reflections on theories of science, of which they constituted an immanent critique. But in C3 I intend also to derive dialectical transcendental realism both without recourse to science and by taking up the challenge of Heideggerian existential phenomenology.

    I will also consider the extent to which dialectical transcendental, more generally critical, realism can be generated by reflection on the presuppositions of the pathology of everyday life. Finally, I should make it explicit that I do not see science as a supreme or overriding value, but only as one among others to be balanced in a balance that cannot be wholly judged by science in ergonic, emancipatory and eudaimonistic activity.

    Nor do I think the objects of science exhaust reality. On the contrary, they afford only a particular angle or slant on reality, picked out precisely for its explanatory scope and power. Moreover, alongside ethical naturalism I am committed to moral realism and I would also like to envisage an adjacent position in aesthetics, indeed viewing it as a branch of practical philosophy, the art of living well. A last word here. Starting with knowledge as a systematic phenomenon I reject that cognitive triumphalism, the roots of which lie in the epistemic fallacy, which identifies what is and what is not with what lies within the bounds of human cognitive competence.

    Reality is a potentially infinite totality, of which we know something but not how much. This is not the least of my differences with Hegel, who, although a more subtle exponent of cognitive triumphalism, Prometheanism or absolutism, nevertheless is a conduit directly connecting his older contemporary Pierre de Laplace to Lenin and thence diamat and the erstwhile command economies of the omniscient party states.

    But Hegel was a much more subtle exponent of cognitive triumphalism, as we shall in due course see. But to understand both one must go back to the roots of this most complex — and hotly contested — concept in ancient Greek thought. Here I will be dealing briefly with material that I will treat in C2 in more thematic and historical detail. These were designed to vindicate the Eleatic cosmology by drawing intuitively unacceptable conclusions from its rejection.

    But the term was first generally applied in a recognizably philosophical context to Socrates ' mode of argument, or elenchus , which was differentiated from the Sophistic eristic , the technique of disputation for the sake of rhetorical success, by the orientation of the Socratic dialogue towards the disinterested pursuit of truth. At one and the same time dialectic was the means of access and assent to the eternal — the universal-and-necessarily-certain — and such Forms or Ideas were the justification for the practice of dialectic.

    In this inaugural moment of the western philosophical tradition, fundamentalism, classical rationalist criteria for knowledge and dialectic were indissolubly linked. Aristotle's opinion of dialectic, which he systematized in his Topics , was considerably less exalted. This last was, however, dependent on the supplementation of induction by nous or that intellectual intuition which allowed us to participate in the divine, i. There are places, however, where Aristotle took dialectic, as the method of working from received opinions endoxa through the discussion and progressive probative augmentation of conflicting views and aporiai, as an alternative way of arriving at archai.

    The first great achieved identity theorist was already caught in a vice between Plato and Hume — a vice that was to determine the subsequent trajectory of western philosophy: historical determination by rationalist epistemology, structural domination by empiricist ontology. The sense of conversational interplay and exchange, involving the assertion, contradiction, distinction and qualification of theses, was retained in the practice of medieval disputation.

    For Kant, dialectic was that part of transcendental logic which showed the mutually contradictory or antinomic state into which the intellect fell when not harnessed to the data of experience. By a turn to transcendental subjectivity, Kant combined, or seemed to combine, the satisfaction of rationalist demands on knowledge with empiricist criteria for being — but only at the price of leaving things-in-themselves unknowable. Kantian dialectic showed the inherently limited nature of human cognitive and moral powers, the resulting inherent impossibilities, as well as the conditions of possibility of human non-archetypal, non-holy intelligence and will.

    For Kant this was enlightenment, but it entrained a systematically sundered world and a whole series of splits, between knowledge and thought, knowledge and faith, phenomena and noumena, the transcendental and the empirical, theory and practical reason, duty and inclination, this world and the next splits which were also interiorized within each term separately , as well as those expressly articulated in the antinomies.

    These dichotomies were to be only weakly albeit influentially repaired in the teleologies of the Critique of Judgement. This spread of connotations of dialectic includes, then, argument and conflict, disputation, struggle and split, dialogue and exchange, but also probative progress, enlightenment, demystification and the critique of illusion. This second Ionian idea typically assumed a dual form: in an ascending dialectic , the existence of a higher reality e. Combination of the ascending and descending phases results in a quasi-spatio-temporal pattern of original unity, loss or division and return or reunification graphically portrayed in Schiller's influential Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Mankind or a quasi-logical pattern of hypostasis, actualization and redemption.

    Combination of the Eleatic and Ionian strands yields the Hegelian absolute — a logical process or dialectic which actualizes itself by alienating , or becoming other than, itself and which restores its self-unity by recognizing this alienation as nothing other than its own free expression or manifestation — a process that is recapitulated and completed in the Hegelian system itself. The three principal keys to Hegel's philosophy — spiritual monism, realized idealism and immanent teleology — can now be cut. Together they form the pediment to it. The outcome of the first dialectical thread in Kant was a view of human beings as bifurcated, disengaged from nature and inherently limited in both cognitive and moral powers.

    For Hegel the problem of elaborating a non-reductionist and subjective monism gradually became tantamount to the problem, posed by the ascending phase of the second dialectical thread, of developing a complete and self-consistent idealism. Such an idealism would, in fusing the finite in the infinite, retain no dualistic or non-rational residues, thereby finally realizing and vindicating the primordial Parmenidean postulate of the identity of being and thought in thought, underpinned by a progressivist view of history.

    Neither Fichte nor Schelling has been able to accomplish this. In Fichte, the non-ego or otherness of being, although originally posited by mind, remained as a permanent barrier to it; so that the principle of idealism became a more Sollen or regulative ideal. For Schelling, this identity was achieved only in intuition, rather than conceptual thought, with the highest manifestation of spirit art rather than philosophy, so that the Parmenidean principle remained unrealized in thought.

    By contrast, in the Hegelian Geistodyssey of infinite, petrified natural and finite mind, the principle of idealism, the speculative understanding of reality as absolute spirit, is unfolded in the shape of an immanent teleology which shows, in response to the problem of the descending phase, how the world exists and, at least in the human realm, develops as a rational totality precisely so that infinite spirit can come to philosophical self-conciousness in the Hegelian system demonstrating this.

    Absolute idealism is the articulation and recognition of the identity of being in thought for thought. In this dialectical inscape, which qualifies the monism of Hegelianism, the major, typically idealist, term thought, the infinite, identity, reason, spirit, etc. The motor of this process is dialectic more narrowly conceived.

    If this were so then Aristotle's criticisms of Platonic diairesis and Kant's of pre-critical metaphysics would indeed entrain the anti-speculative implications they themselves drew. Although the principle of the mutual exclusion of opposites, entailing rigid definitions and fixed polarities, is adequate for the finite objects grasped by common sense and the empirical sciences, the infinite totalities of reason which, of course, constellationally embrace the former require the dialectical principle of the identity of exclusive opposites.

    And Hegel's central logical claim is that the identity of opposites is not incompatible with their exclusion, but rather depends upon it. For it is the experience of what in non-dialectical terms would be a logical contradiction which at once indicates the need for an expansion of the universe of discourse or thought and at the same time yields a more comprehensive, richly differentiated or highly mediated conceptual form. It is this experience in which dialectic proper consists as the second member of a triad composed of the understanding, dialectic or negative and speculative or positive reason, representing the principles of identity, negativity and rational totality respectively.

    I will go into the fine structure of this dynamic shortly. On this interpretation, the dialectical fertility of contradictions depends upon their analytical unacceptability. Hence any dialectical logic must incorporate an analytical one as a special — and vitally generative — case. From the achieved vantage point of positive reason the mutual exclusivity of opposites passes over into the recognition of their reciprocal interdependence mutual inclusion : they remain inseparable yet distinct moments in a richer, more total conceptual form-ation which will in turn generate a new contradiction of its own.

    It is the constellational identity of understanding and reason within reason which fashions the continually recursively expanding kaleidoscopic tableaux of absolute idealism. Dialectic, then, in this narrow sense, is a method — or better, experience — of determinate negation — which enables the dialectical commentator to observe the process by which the various categories, notions or forms of consciousness arise out of each other to form ever more inclusive totalities until the system of categories, notions or forms as a whole is completed.

    This is one of the reasons why Hegelian dialectic is so difficult to understand ; and a respect in which Hegel's talk about the self-development of the concept, as if it were automatic [understanding-like], is at the very least disingenuous. But in fact Hegel does not think that the U-D-R scheme exhausts the matter. It was, of course, to this pre-reflective reasonableness that the later Wittgenstein was always trying, but never quite able, to return.

    So we could schematize the whole process as in Figure 1. For Hegel, then, truth is the whole, the whole is a process and this process is reason dt' as dp' as dr'. Its result is reconciliation to life in Hegelian freedom. Error lies in one-sidedness, incompleteness and abstraction. Its symptom is the contradictions it generates and its remedy their incorporation into fuller, richer, more concrete, inclusive, englobing and highly mediated conceptual forms. In the course of this process, the famous principle of dialectical sublation ds' or Aufhebung is observed: as the dialectic unfolds, no partial insight is ever lost.

    Truth is, however, not only the whole but a norm against which the adequacy of any particular reality to its notion and its stage in the development of the notion or reality i. In short, Hegelian dialectic is the actualized entelechy of the present, comprehended and so enjoyed as the end of everything that has led up to it. It is now possible to make some systematic connections between the Hegelian dialectic and the argument we have developed so far, and to comment further upon the former.

    The general character of any U-D-R movement or transition is that of a preservative determinate negation. Now this has the very interesting property of representing a non-arbitrary principle of stratification , structuration or superstructure-formation, which I shall explore later. Suffice it to say now that, properly transposed and situated, it forms the kernel to the solution of an important class of philosophical problems those turning on the absence of an analogue of dr' or dg' at 1M as well as being an interesting ontological figure in its own right forming, for instance, an analogue of real material emergence.

    Within any U-D-R movement, the dialectical moment proper dc' reports and speculative reason dr' remedies a real negation or absence in the base concept or form at, let us say, level L 1. The dialectical movement to the resolution at L 2 consists in a transformative negation of a determinate and preservative type in consciousness or experience of that at L 1. In virtue of what is this transformative negation a real negation? It absents the absence in L 1. This is the sense in which determinate negation is the negation of the negation.

    In this expanding warehouse of reason, each successive operation is in principle bracketed and retained. Both are in principle additive and cumulative: nothing except absence itself is lost. The Hegelian totality is constellationally closed, completed. Hegel's, like Aristotle's, is an achieved identity theory, but, unlike Aristotle's, it incorporates the sequence of stages or conceptual shapes leading up to it as moments within it and is in fact nothing but this movement of shapes including the finalizing consummating stage, the self-consciousness of spirit as absolute spirit in the Hegelian system itself.

    Speculative philosophy — and its social matrix, rational history — is constellationally finished, at an end.

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    It is at a plateau. There remains a future, of course, but this can be grasped by the understanding — it does not require dialectic or speculative reason. This is the constellational identity of the future within the Hegelian present. It is the failure of concepts and forms to meet the requirement of the posited end — the absolute idea as absolute spirit — this lack and this teleology, that pulls the Hegelian dialectic forwards. It is generally only retrospectively , ex post, that a stage can be seen to be deficient.

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    In the latter case the critique is really transcendent, not immanent. And accordingly we might distinguish between good and bad radical negations. Of course, as the Hegelian totality is constellationally closed, all the contradictions, whether teleonomically or teleologically generated, are internal ones — and neglect of external contradictions, and more generally constraints, has been a damaging feature of Marxian social theory in the Hegelian mould, one which the foil, say, of Aristotelian dialectics may help to correct. This question of the autogenesis of the dialectical movement is closely bound up with the linearity of the Hegelian dialectic.

    Once again Hegel's theory is at odds with his practice here. His dialectics are not in fact logically, as distinct from textually, linear: they job around all over the place, affecting an incessant variety of perspective switches motivated by Hegel's desire not to just illustrate his dialectics but also to absorb and treat more and more phenomena dialectically in a continuing — and in principle open-ended — process of dialectical suction.

    Nor is there any reason in principle why dialectics of a Hegelian or non-Hegelian type should be linear. They could consist in recursively unfolding matrices, Gestalten or any of a variety of topological modes. These issues of autogeneticity and linearity are related to, but in principle distinct from, the epistemological status of Hegel's dialectics. There are three main interpretations: a that they are, or purport to be, totally self-generative and autonomous, dependent on no external subject-matter — the realization of the dream of intellectual intuition from Aristotle to Fichte in a hyperintuitive 30 and parthenogenetic process, including — in the transition from Logic to Nature, i.

    Corresponding to the distinction just made between good and bad radical negations and immanent versus transcendent critiques , I want to distinguish between good and bad totalities. Good totalities are, though this is not their only characteristic, open; bad totalities are, whether constellationally or otherwise, closed. Now this is the exact opposite of Hegel's point of view. But why should an open totality involve an infinite regress? An infinite regress implies more of the same , that significant changes and even the principles of change might not change, which is just what the concept of an open totality denies.

    Later I will show that totalities in general are and must be open. But for the moment let us stick with Hegel. Even if it is admitted that there is some kind of inadequacy or lack in an open totality tautologically, a lack of completion , there is no inadequacy or lack in the thought of an open totality, which is what is at stake here. This thought can even, and perhaps must, be constellationally contained within the present itself an indefinite boundary zone between past and future.

    Of course, Hegel's realized idealism, his principle of identity, will not allow him to accept this; there must be no mismatch — rather an identity — between totality and the thought of totality. But if truth consists in totality and the conformity of an object to its notion, it is clear that the concept of an open totality must be more true complete and adequate than the concept of a closed totality, because it is more comprehensive, englobing and contains the latter as a special case. I shall also be arguing in C2. Dialectical arguments and, for instance, the ontological necessities [and contingencies] they can establish are no more the privilege of absolute idealism than transcendental arguments are the prerogative of Kant.

    The practice therefore remains. Transformative negation is confined to thought. Once again Hegel is untrue to his theory of truth. If reality is out of kilter with the notion of it, it is reality which should be adjusted, not its truth.