USD 30 paperback. University Park, PA. ISBN paperback. Gundara, Jagdish; Sidney Jacobs eds. Aldershot: Ashgate. Budapest: CEU Press, Elites after State Socialism Theories and Analysis. Ignatieff, Michael, Virtual War. Kosovo and Beyond. Jaram, Vlado ed. Zagreb:Centar za transfer tehnologije, Jokic, Aleksandar ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, Documentation of a Seminar, Dubrovnik, May Zenska Infoteka, Budapest: Central European University Press, Lazic, Mladen Ed.
Tables, figures, photograph, appendix. Lutem, Omer E. Balkan Diplomasisi. Ankara: ASAM, Reviewed by Bestami S. Mahmutcehajic, Rusmir, Prozori: Rijeci i slike. Jones and Milena Maric forthcoming. McBride, William L. New York, Oxford. Reviewed by David H. Milosevic, Milan, Die Parteienlandschaft Serbiens. Berlin: Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz, Index, Bibliography. Bucharest Humanitas Publishing House, Reviewed by Marian Chiriac , June London: Cambridge University Press, Radan, Peter and Aleksandar Pavkovic eds. GBP There is a KFC and a hulking mosque and a maze of relief organizations.
On the north of the Ibar, which you reach by a bridge blockaded at both ends by dark blue Italian Carabinieri armored vehicles, signs shift to Cyrillic. The Serbs use dinars. The city becomes visibly more bedraggled. Shabby streets are packed with internet gambling joints bearing blacked-out windows.
Russian flags hang from banners. Posters of Putin are plastered across apartment buildings. Men in black jackets languish at the Gavrilo Princip cafe. Early one Tuesday morning, I was awoken in Mitrovica by the clang of air raid sirens.
But the sirens were instead signaling that a police operation was at work north of the city, a few miles from the Serbian border. The sirens were signposting, in effect, the opposite of a Serb raid—that Pristina, which has never adequately controlled North Kosovo, was making a rare demonstration of its authority in its ethnic Serb enclave. At least 12 heavily armored vehicles, along with a handful of U.
The Road To Kosovo: A Balkan Diary
Army jeeps and U. North Kosovo is not just a borderland; it is a gangland. It would be difficult to overestimate the pervasiveness of its black market into daily life. Smuggling is not merely another petty act of defiance against the perceived overreach and indefensibility of Albanian authority. Its tobacco peddlers hawk some of the cheapest cigarettes anywhere in Europe. Last week, driving near the town of Leposavic and the fabled Vracevo Monastery, my guide pointed out roads down which, over the course of the afternoon, wheelers and white vans routinely rumbled.
At least five of them wound through the foothills of Mount Kopaonik, snaking in and out of Serbia in parallel to the legal road system. Almost everything North Kosovo consumed—from dish soap to entire herds of cattle—arrived on them, none of it taxed. Some police looked the other way. Others took a cut. Pristina loses millions of dollars off this black market every year.
Why does it tolerate it? It is not merely that the Albanian authorities in Pristina know that the smuggling is happening and are powerless to do anything about it. Why the raid, and why now? The reader should not be put off by the slow start. The first two chapters elaborate on the Bosnian peace.
His conclusions are generally negative. More than two years later, he sees little improvement in the situation except for the lack of active combat, which he acknowledges to be no mean achievement.
Campbell points out the effectiveness of powerful, unambiguous force in separating combatants, but is clear in showing the frustration of peacekeepers in not being able to do more to help the cause of permanent peace. He also takes up a theme here that continues through the book, that of history as justification. Anyone familiar with the Balkans has heard that explanation before, but the depth of the religious and ethnic animosities still boggles the American mind.
The middle chapters provide historical context and raise several key issues in the process. Campbell's history is readable and easily understood, but he accepts the Serb account of the Battle of Kosovo Polje without reservation. In this view, the Serbs alone fought the Turks, a clear historical inaccuracy. Readers may want to consult Kosovo: A Short History by Noel Malcolm for a fuller and more accurate account of one of history's most politicized events.
The quick review of 20th-century Balkan history segues smoothly into the topic of the Clinton Administration policy, which Campbell rates as poor in Bosnia, and possibly better in Kosovo.
The Road To Kosovo: A Balkan Diary
His treatment of propaganda and war criminals is excellent and well worth reading. Chapter six looks at Montenegro's history, a subject routinely overlooked because Montenegro has played second fiddle to Serbia in the Yugoslav Federation. While not essential to the story, the treatment of Montenegro provides an otherwise missing piece to the puzzle of this region. Only in the last three chapters does the author finally turn to Kosovo.
He correctly points out that the failure of the Dayton Accords to address Kosovo led directly to the crisis of , and that the rise of the Kosovo Liberation Army KLA was a direct response to years of continuous Serbian repression. He also shows that while the KLA may have some dubious connections at the top, it is fueled by grass roots popular support that must be taken into account. Campbell, in less than a page, lays out the doomsday spillover scenario that could eventually engulf all of Europe in war. It was the plausibility of such a scenario that motivated NATO to use coercive diplomacy in Bosnia and Serbia as a means of stabilizing the dangerous situation.
He ends with a brutal look at the shallowness of the official unarmed observer missions and their lack of effectiveness. The key virtues of this book are its elaboration of two factors that actually played out after its publication. One is that NATO's intervention was not the result of a single event but rather the culmination of a train of events years in the making. The second is that the degree of repression in Kosovo had reached an intolerable pitch long before the first NATO bomb dropped.
NATO clearly did not cause the humanitarian disaster in Kosovo; the government of Serbia caused the disaster by its deliberate policy. Many may criticize NATO for its actions, but Campbell convincingly demonstrates that those actions were necessary. It is doubtful that this book will win any literary prizes, but it can provide valuable insights to members of a defense community hip deep in Kosovo. Senior leaders and troop commanders would both do well in reading this book. It provides a feel for what is at stake in Kosovo for the various participants.
Given that soldiers seldom have time to do detailed historical research in the midst of a crisis, Campbell's short, readable book may well fill the void in their knowledge as they face the daunting task of rebuilding Kosovo. The Pity of War. By Niall Ferguson. New York: Basic Books, Reviewed by Tim Travers , professor of history, University of Calgary.
This is a massive book about World War I, some pages of closely printed text, plus another odd pages of introduction. As might be expected, Ferguson shows a remarkable grasp of the literature of this war, listing 53 pages of even more closely printed footnotes, together with some 25 packed pages of bibliography. The reader will also find a large number of tables and statistics to back up Ferguson's arguments.
In general, the book is heavily influenced by Ferguson's previous interests in economic history, and in the application of counter-factuals to history. Hence, some of the most intriguing questions raised in this work are Ferguson's application of statistics to the problem of how to gauge the efficiency of nations involved in fighting World War I, plus some "what if" musings regarding, among other things, what might have happened if the Central Powers had won the war.
On the other hand, there is less emphasis on the operational aspects of the war. Ferguson begins by posing ten questions, which he goes on to answer. Since these form the vital structure and purpose of the book, it is useful to enumerate them. Was the war inevitable? Why did Germany's leaders gamble on war in ? Why did Britain's leaders choose to intervene? Was the war really greeted with popular enthusiasm?
Did propaganda keep the war going? Why did the economic superiority of the British Empire not have a greater impact on the defeat of Germany? Why did the military superiority of the German army not inflict defeat on the Allied armies on the Western Front? Why did men keep fighting despite the conditions at the front? Why did some men stop fighting? Who won the peace and who ended up paying for the war? One of the most controversial aspects of the book is Ferguson's thesis that Britain did not have to enter the war.
There was no strict legal necessity stemming from the treaty with Belgium, and there was no binding contractual obligation to France. Instead, Prime Minister Grey opted for war on the basis that if Britain remained neutral, Germany would gain overwhelming power on the continent and in the North Sea. The violation of all of Belgium, and fear of the Liberal government falling, were other considerations. Although Ferguson concludes the book by arguing that a world war was therefore avoidable through Britain's neutrality, it would seem that Grey's fear about future German power on the continent was a legitimate concern.
Ferguson then argues against the idea that there was initial massive enthusiasm for the war on the continent and in Britain. He is probably correct in emphasizing that much of the enthusiasm in Britain was restricted to the middle and upper classes, although there is no denying that , men volunteered in the first month of the war. Ferguson is at his best when he applies statistics to the war, and here he shows that, contrary to general opinion, Germany did better at managing the war economy than did members of the Entente. Ferguson also applies cold statistics to the war effort, and claims that Germany was more than three times as efficient at killing her enemies than the Entente was.
Why, then, did Germany and her allies lose the war? Ferguson answers that it was not necessarily because of better Entente tactics in , but because of a decline in German morale on the Western Front in that year. This is a controversial area, and there are a number of historians now who would like to argue that it was indeed the improvement in tactics which brought the conflict to a conclusion. In any case, the question of morale then leads Ferguson to ask why men continued to fight despite the harrowing conditions of the front, and consequently, why did more men not surrender?
The last question opens up an interesting though not pleasant aspect of war.
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Ferguson points out what historians of the war already know, namely, that one disincentive to surrender was that all sides tended on occasion to kill prisoners. There are a number of reasons for this, but probably Ferguson exaggerates its incidence, and the fact certainly did not prevent men from surrendering. Moreover, starting in August , large numbers of Germans did surrender on the Western Front, and, according to Ferguson, this was the key to the end of the war.
Ferguson then looks at the financial outcome of the war, and here he considers that John Maynard Keynes was outmaneuvered by the German financiers.
Playacting the Cold War in Kosovo – Foreign Policy
Ferguson concludes the book by suggesting that Germany came out of the war in reasonable economic shape, apart from inflation. Overall, this is a compelling, brilliant, and unusual book, which manages to look at the war from many fresh perspectives. It is definitely worth reading, although one still finds it difficult to accept Ferguson's basic argument that Britain's involvement was unnecessary and turned the conflict from a continental to a world war. The Myth of Global Chaos. By Yahya Sadowski. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, After Marxism collapsed, a new specter came to haunt the United States and Europe, the specter of global chaos.
America's experience in Somalia, Europe's in Bosnia, and Russia's in Chechnya mixed with the musings of journalists and the speculations of theorists to convince a number of important people that anarchy was increasing and thugs and warriors multiplying. For example, at one point this belief was shared by the President, the Vice President, and the Director of the Agency for International Development. The specter of global chaos continues to hover menacingly over any number of Pentagon briefings and commission deliberations. Yahya Sadowski chronicles the rise of this specter.
Indeed, the best part of his book is the chapter describing how notions of impending anarchy floated into the Washington zeitgeist. According to Sadowski, these notions originated in a group of writers he calls the global chaos theorists. They argued that a number of trends were leading to ethnic or cultural wars that were more frequent, lethal, and vicious than previous wars.
Sadowski counters this claim by arguing that the trends--economic and cultural globalization--do not necessarily lead to cultural conflict and that those wars that are occurring are not necessarily more frequent, lethal, or vicious than their predecessors. He supports this argument with an abundance of statistics presented in a variety of tables and figures, covering everything from the relationship between television ownership and cultural conflict to war mortality since Some of this argument and support is good, some little more than "back of the envelope" noodling, as Sadowski himself calls it.
Yet in demonstrating that globalization does not necessarily lead to conflict, Sadowski does not refute the proponents of global chaos. Sadowski's arguments are insufficient because he has apparently misunderstood the chaos theorists. He believes that the important point for these theorists was the supposed increase in conflict, and its increasingly brutal nature, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In fact, the key point for the chaos theorists was not a recent increase in conflict but a long-term decline in order, primarily a long-term decline in the strength of the foundation of domestic and international order, the nation-state.
Thus, although Sadowski shows that globalization does not necessarily increase conflict and that conflict has not become more vicious, this does not disprove the claim that we are now witnessing the early stages of a long-term decline of the nation-state and an increase in anarchy or chaos. The problem with Sadowski's approach is evident in the fact that he begins his discussion by referring to Francis Fukuyama's claim that we have come to the end of history.
Like so many before him, Sadowski interprets this claim to mean that conflict has come to an end. All those who disagree with this view, who believe for one reason or another that conflict will continue or increase, Sadowski labels "chaos theorists. The problem here is twofold: Sadowski misinterprets Fukuyama and is wrong to claim that conflict, even an increasing rate of conflict, is the same as chaos. First, Fukuyama did not argue that conflict had come to an end or that it would soon. He argued only that conflicts were no longer being fought over how men should live. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, that question had been decided; liberal democracy had won.
Brutal conflicts would continue but such conflicts were merely mopping-up operations in post-historical time. This view may be wrong but it does not amount to claiming that a new world order has emerged putting an end to conflict. Second, near the end of his book, when Sadowski gets around to defining chaos and he does it then only implicitly , he writes that chaos is the absence of "behavior [that] has structured underpinnings that make it rationally understandable if not exactly predictable. Thus conflict, even by Sadowski's definition, is not the same as chaos. Huntington is not claiming that we will be engulfed by chaos when he claims that conflict in the future will consist of clashes between civilizations.
Indeed, given Sadowski's implicit definition of chaos, few on his list would qualify as a chaos theorist. In fact, the coming anarchy has only two theorists, the popularizers Robert Kaplan and Peters. Kaplan in particular built his speculations on the selective reading of a number of analysts working in a variety of areas from the environment to the history and nature of war.
If one wants to prove that the coming anarchy is a myth, one needs to attack the sources that Kaplan drew on. Sadowski does not do this.
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As we get some distance from the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Somalia, assuming these cases are not followed by similar spectacles, the need to do so becomes less pressing. Yet the fate of the nation-state remains a critical issue, especially for the military, with which the nation-state has been so intimately entwined. That issue can be pursued in the writings of less popular but more serious writers such as Michael Mann and Linda Weiss.
Boone Bartholomees, Jr. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, Professor Bartholomees has written a book that fills a significant gap. Most students of the War of the Rebellion focus on battles and leaders without giving much thought to staff operations. Most students of modern headquarters and staff operations find little of interest in the centuries of military affairs preceding the functionally aligned "general staff" that emerged in the decades following that war. Since Boone Bartholomees focuses all of his attention on the Civil War and sees it occurring on a "cusp of military history"--having elements of both ancient and modern approaches--he has written a book that will advance the knowledge of both groups.
His book reflects his origins and broader purposes.
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Having been a highly successful Army officer in a long career of command and staff assignments, he has a deep appreciation of his subject. Knowing how armies are able to rise to wartime challenges is important to the military professional, and assessing the performance of staffs is an essential element of modern analysis. But Bartholomees is also a professional historian with well-developed research skills that allow him to conduct an informed assessment of staffs in an army that placed no special emphasis on staff operations in the field. This book breaks new ground.
Such a statement can seldom be made about a new Civil War title, and I find it remarkable that it can be made about a book on this subject. When the veterans of the Civil War carried the Army school system to new levels in the latter decades of the 19th century, they emphasized applied methods and combined arms warfare. When the War College was added to the system, it emphasized staff work at the national level. The Civil War was included in the curricula of the relevant schools--as were staff operations--but no one ever seems to have asked and answered the questions Professor Bartholomees addresses here: Who were these staff officers?
What were they doing, or think they were doing? What should they have been doing? How did they operate? What did they contribute? The approach Professor Bartholomees has taken to answer these questions will appeal to students of military affairs as well as to Civil War buffs. He provides several general sections such as staff selection and training, headquarters personnel, and staff procedures. These are well-researched, clearly written, and informative. The bulk of the book is built around discussion of specific staff functions, e. This allows an individual with an interest in a specific function to read about that interest and then set the new information into context by reading the general sections.
Throughout the volume Professor Bartholomees draws intelligently on a range of sources that demonstrate the breadth of the holdings at the US Army's Military History Institute.