He begins by given in terms of categorical properties—being blue, being square, being introducing verse 34 as follows: hard, etc—and are treated like quiddities, what dharmas simply are in Well, if observation and non-observation are no basis for knowing themselves. The activities and capabilities, on the other hand, are the co-presence and co-absence [of smoke and fire], how then does presented in causal terms, e.
Words that are typically used in these absent. It is the Indian not-deviating. The details and problems cannot be taken up here. This without exception in the actual world because of natures in this world. Tillemans , — Hume had famously said in Section 7 of his Enquiry to be taken? How do his two positions hang together? Gillon is to consist in contingent regularities established by observation. Thus we might determined by, and corresponds to, the particular itself. To take a modern analogy radical indeed and yields what seems to be a counterintuitive consequence. Non-Buddhist thinkers, such as otherwise, fallibly through empirical methods.
They could cheerfully allow that when one person sees a vase and another thinks 2. Just as there are only two kinds of objects not go that route as a nominalist. Particulars are the objects of perception and universals are the and when are we justified in thinking that these conditions are met? For both these Tibetan schools, justification rather than truth. We can justifiably conclude, for example, that reliable route. Note that while most sense perceptions are Epistemologist adopts an internalist account of epistemic justification?
Is to be confirmed by subsequent perceptions or inferences, there is no the Buddhist saying that when you genuinely know something, you need infinite regress here: some perceptions—e. It characteristics of the reason. It need not mean that when one knows must also be a cognition that came about via a reliable route, i.
Tibetan scholars will i. Reflexive awareness is aware them. So, while a person would be aware of the brute fact that thoughts Ineffability thus unpacks as a thorough mismatch between representations were occurring, their credentials are another matter. For Buddhist Epistemologists this mismatch means that they cannot 2. However, it also leads to a language would be useless in daily life. But why then say that language larger matter.
The problem is that if the real world is composed only of and thought somehow fail to capture them? The answer is twofold. The Buddhist Epistemologists are, in effect, to borrow an idea negation of other things. Here are between these two quasi-universals. However, it can be plausibly reconstructed.
Buddhist 2. Even fact that x causes perceptions of blue, a fact which is what it is objectively though it does not have the ontological baggage of a real universal, the and independently of interests. This top-down in that he relies upon the descriptive content of the apoha to can be accomplished, according to Buddhist Epistemologists, because the pick out the appropriate particulars.
In what seems to be at least partially a top-down approach, Mark Siderits has taken the relevant double negation as 2. Finally, perhaps the most striking modern use of double negation as criticisms may be less telling. The century parallels in Indian philosophy and was not motivated primarily by way words link to things is thus primarily explained through the existence nominalist ontological worries.
Thoughts and talk of blue are thus about blue dubbing from speaker to speaker. Here are two of the main ones. The judgments and resulting use of words are causal rather than descriptive account of aboutness, what role remains for about blue things, and not red things, precisely because there is a causal the apoha, i.
How then do words refer to grouped entities via a causal chain? And how does the causal chain get passed on over time in a community of speakers? This dubbing is a purely causal event not causal, but is a hybrid theory involving both causal and descriptive dependent on any descriptive content. These multiple ways distribution anvaya over several instances, is it genuinely distinct exhibit no intrinsic properties in common that would explain why from or the same as the instances?
In the former case, it would not they all work to produce a desired common effect. At most there is apply to them; in the latter case it would itself be a particular and just the negative grouping of being distinct from everything which unable to apply to other particulars.
Logic and Philosophy of logic attempt at raising distribution or a distributed entity to the level of ultimate reality. We've come full circle back abhyupagama of A being C. The a type of contraposition, turning on modus tollens. Both these structures, i. Chi, in his Since T.
The term fact, the notion of formal validity i. Thus, for example, the standard formal reasoning that themselves words. Not surprisingly, the idea that provers are apoha-properties rather A is C. When do we have the same Commentators make an explicit correlation with the triple criterion property and when do they differ? Thus the first statement perspicuously expresses the pervasion Tibetan: yin khyab mnyam , as in the case of being impermanent i.
The impermanent particulars will be identical with the produced particulars. Although A is B, i. While the inference-for-others has often been thought to impermanent. And yet it might also be thought that and being produced are arguably identical in that way, and it would thus the move from premises to conclusion is an acceptable application of the seem that if that is what conceptual identity is about for a Buddhist principle of substitutivity of identicals for identicals salva veritate.
What Epistemologist it should be possible to make the substitution in the opaque went wrong? He saw this undesirable predicate term in a language there is a different concept—synonyms, for consequence as one of the main challenges to logical thought, i. The contexts. And in the opaque context substitution horror. In fact, though, it could be said that the usual idea of an intensional 4. They were also used to establish Buddhist religious doctrines, like Castes were natural kinds explainable through universals for non- the Four Noble Truths, the proofs of the Buddha being an Buddhists, and were not arbitrary or man-made customary distinctions.
He advocates a quite remarkable method of meditation— incomprehensible, for there would be no speakers' intentions.
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In analysis plays an indispensable role see e. Scripture, if it passes certain religious dimension to his arguments. The eighth century commentator Eltschinger Chapter I and autocommentary are partially translated in several publications: I. Taken further, it would have major consequences for autocommentary are translated into English in Mookerjee and Nagasaki Buddhist ethics. For a German translation of Chapter I. Eltschinger gives a public debate. Indeed he seems to have been quite aware that invoking French translation of I.
Eltschinger, Krasser, and Taber such purely scriptural positions would fall flat outside the context of contains an English translation of I. Dunne gives English translations of I. Unfortunately, Franco , Dunne , van Bijlert , and into German in however, over history the later Indo-Tibetan Buddhist scholastic Vetter Chapter IV. It is regrettable that much of the thought of this the table in Dunne , p.
For an earlier, but still important, highly inquisitive and subtle philosopher often became, in later Indian and bibliography on the research on Buddhist epistemology and logic, see Tibetan Buddhism, a series of unquestioned formulae to secure Buddhist Steinkellner and Much Bibliography 5. Here are what we consider to Philosophy, — Jackson and J.
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London: Curzon, — Clarendon Press, Studies on the History, Dreyfus, Georges B. Lang Verlag 49 4 : — Morgenlandes, — Wiesbaden: Franz Journal of Indian Philosophy, 3: 3— Steiner, Tillemans, Chakrabarti eds. Gillon, Brendan S. Serie and Buddhist Studies, 33 1 : — Struktur und Entwicklung des Schlusses Oriente. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. Reprinted in Mimaki et al. Johannes [35—40]. Vienna, August Akademie der Wissenschaften. Matilal, Bimal K. Steinkellner ed.
Horner, Dordrecht: D. Philosophy, 15 1 : 59— Mimaki, Katsumi et al. Vienna, August 23—27, , Vienna , — Miyasaka, Yusho ed. Acta Indologica, 2: 1— Calcutta: University of Calcutta. Philosophy, — Stcherbatsky, T. Reprinted The Hague: Mouton and Co. Matilal and R. Evans, eds. Zweites Kapitel: Buddhist Logic and Epistemology. Reidel Publishing, — Zweites Kapitel: ———, , Scripture, Logic, Language. Somerville MA: Wisdom Publications. Gnoli and L. Craig ed. The Routledge Encyclopedia japanischen Kultur, 83— Second and concepts justification, epistemic: internalist vs. Dreyfus , Steinkellner , Tillemans , Dunne The who was in India from to C.
See Tillemans , p. By grounding reliability in telic efficacy Buddhist thinkers seek to justify beliefs by interpreting them as descriptions of their objects' causal characteristics. Hence, the ultimate arbiter of a cognition's reliability is the way in which it presents its objects in causal terms. If it presents the object's causal characteristics such that the object is capable of functioning in the expected fashion, then the cognition is reliable; otherwise, it is not.
In some cases the evidence for the desired functionality is given with the cognition itself: for example, the sensation of warmth requires no other cognition to verify that one is feeling warm.
In other instances of perception another cognition must verify the cognition's content. One may only glimpse the fire from a corner of the room, and one must appeal to inferential evidence such as smoke or a subsequent perception to verify that one was indeed seeing fire. Arguments for a cognition's reliability generally serve to justify a belief. Thus, one's belief that "there is a fire in the hearth" is true inasmuch as the cognition that includes that belief reliably represents the causal characteristics of the object in question.
For that cognition to be an act of knowing, however, that cognition must include other dispositions. Thus, for Buddhists the account of knowledge as justified true belief is inadequate if that account ignores the role played by cognitive dispositions, especially those related to purpose. In appealing to dispositions related to purpose Buddhist epistemologists hold that the reliability of a belief shifts according to the purpose to which it is tied.
One might believe, for example, that the object on one's table is an unbreakable vase, although it is in fact fragile. Relative to the purpose of containing a bouquet, the cognition in which that belief occurs is reliable, since the vase can function so as to hold flowers. But relative to the aim of cracking a walnut's shell, a cognition in which that belief occurs would not be reliable, since the vase lacks the causal capacity to crack open a nut.
By thus evaluating complex beliefs within various teleological contexts, Buddhist thinkers can accept some philosophical claims in one context, while rejecting them in another — a strategy that is central to Buddhist soteriology. In relating reliability to purpose Buddhist epistemologists argue that an act of knowing must not only be reliable but must also be a motivator of purposeful action. On either version — motivation or novelty — this requirement points not only to the role of purpose but also to the notion that an act of knowing reduces doubt.
Finally, the notion that an act of knowing must motivate action is also tied to ontological issues. The chief concern here is to eliminate the possibility that universals could be the objects of perception. As will be evident in the following text, the Buddhist strategy is to make perception the actual motivator of action, while relegating the determinate content of perception to a subsequent judgment, which is not strictly speaking the motivator. As one of the two types of cognitions that are both reliable and motivate action, a perception is an act of knowledge.
Unlike inference, in perception the image is produced directly by the object, and the reliability of perception is based on this direct causal relation. As a mental moment, a perception is causally conditioned by the previous mental moment, including all the dispositions and physiological conditions that contribute to its occurrence.
In a perception, however, not only the previous mental moment but also the perceived object is contributing causally to the occurrence of the perception. Hence, the causal character of the mental moment that is a perception is restrained niyata by the causal characteristics of the object to which it is in relation through the sense organ.
Thus, a perception is reliable — it accurately reflects the object's causal characteristics — because the causal constraints imposed by the object on the perception's contents are indicative of that object's causal characteristics. To put it another way, the perception of blue is a reliable indicator of its object's causal characteristics because when that content — an image of blue — is the undistorted effect of an object, it can only be produced by an object with the causal capacity to produce a blue image.
This appeal to a causal relation between perceptual content and object compels Buddhist epistemologists to face the problem of illusion. A favorite Tibetan example is the "blue snow mountain": When one looks at a snowy Himalayan peak on a clear day, the snowcap appears blue because it reflects the sky's color.
But since the perceptual content — the image — is distorted by causal factors not given with the object, the content itself does not provide any basis for recognizing that distortion. Instead, some other perception or inference would need to reveal that distortion. Still, as noted earlier, some perceptions are alleged to be intrinsically reliable, such that they do not require confirmation by a subsequent act of knowing. What then would distinguish those perceptions such that, unlike the sight of "blue snow," they could never be spurious?
Buddhist epistemologists do not provide an easy answer to this question, but their theory of perceptual judgment provides a partial response. On their view perception itself is indeterminate in that it involves no conceptual or linguistic operation. A purely indeterminate cognitive event, however, cannot be either reliable or unreliable because it conveys no knowledge about the causal characteristics of its object in relation to one's goal. Strictly speaking, only the judgment is reliable or unreliable, in that it only describes the object in a determinate fashion.
Nevertheless, since the form of that judgment is causally constrained by the image presented by indeterminate perception, the perception itself is considered reliable. Returning, then, to the problem of illusion, the theory of perceptual judgment means that an uninterpreted perception could not itself be an act of knowing because, lacking any depiction of its object's causal characteristics, it could not be reliable.
But when the subsequent judgment describes the object, it must do so in relation to a particular goal. One explicit outcome of this in theory is that a perception may only be partially reliable in that it can lead to correct judgments in regard to one goal, but not in regard to some other goal. For example, the perceptual content interpreted as "blue snow" might be unreliable in regard to one's need to identify a blue object, and yet it may still be reliable in regard to the need to identify snow. Although the implications of this claim are left covert, it seems likely that for Buddhist epistemologists one factor in the intrinsic reliability of some perceptions is that the goals in question are such that the perceptual content could never be erroneously interpreted.
In other words the teleological context constrains the perceptual judgment such that incorrect interpretations of the perceptual content cannot occur in those cases. Besides its role in intrinsic reliability, the theory of perceptual judgment is also closely allied to Buddhist ontological concerns. The paradigmatic case of an entity's causal efficiency is its capacity to produce an image of itself in a perceiver's mind, and it is for this reason that Dharmakirti remarks, "To exist is to be perceived" sattvam upalabdhir eva.
Moreover, since any object of perception must exist, Buddhists are careful to exclude the possibility of perceiving any metaphysically objectionable entity, such as a fixed personal essence. Largely because a personal essence is considered a special case of a universal, Buddhists likewise reject the existence — and hence the perception — of universals.
Perception cannot include universals, and linguistic or conceptual cognitions must include universals. Hence, perception must be a sheer apprehension of an object that is not linguistic or conceptual in character. But as noted earlier, the criterion of reliability requires a determinate cognition, which is necessarily conceptual or linguistic in form. Hence, on the one hand, perception must be the immediate apprehension of a particular through a nonconceptual image in the mind and, on the other hand, to be reliable and to motivate action, that nonconceptual content must be interpreted by a determinate cognition.
The solution is to relegate the determinate aspect of a perception to an immediately subsequent judgment, and in doing so Buddhists avoid the notion that linguistic or conceptual entities — that is, universals — are the objects of perception. Besides perception, inference is considered an act of knowing.
As with perception, inference is a cognitive event in which an image of the object appears. Unlike perception, however, the image in an inference is not directly produced by the object. Instead, it bears an indirect causal relation to the object in two ways, namely, by way of the relations on which an inference relies and by way of the process of constructing universals. The Buddhist approach to universals is central to their theory of inference because inferences are conceptual or linguistic acts of knowing. Moreover, their theory arises in response to the way their non-Buddhist rivals address the problem of reference.
In short, these rivals claim that, for words to successfully refer to their proper referents, they must always have a relation to those referents and only to those referents.
The word cow , for example, should refer only to a cow, and not to something different, such as a horse. Each individual cow, however, is different from every other cow. Hence, if the word cow were to stand in a direct relation to one individual cow, it should always refer only to that individual. Such would be the case because the word cow should never refer to something that is different from its proper referent, and if the proper referent of the word cow were a particular cow, then by referring to some other cow, the word cow would be referring to something different from its proper referent.
And if the word cow can refer both to its proper referent and something other than its proper referent, why should it not refer to a horse? On this model, the word cow does not have a direct relation to any particular cow. Instead, it is directly related to the universal "cowness. A word such as cow thus refers to each particular cow by virtue of the universal cowness to which both the word and each particular are related.
On this view one can thus say that all cows are the same not because each individual is identical, but because each individual instantiates that one universal cowness. This model is problematic for Buddhists because it would justify the false belief in a personal essence.
That is, just as cowness is present in each different cow in time and space, so, too, a personal essence would be present in all the different spatiotemporal instances of what people consider to be one person. To avoid this outcome, Buddhist epistemologists therefore deny the ultimate reality of universals as things in the world.
Thus, for them the universe is populated by spatiotemporally unique particulars, and nothing more. So too, each spatiotemporal instance of a person is actually unique. When one constructs a sameness that warrants one's use of the label "John," one falsely believes that the sameness is not constructed, but real.