Robinson , More specific claims, such as that expression and exemplification are relative to the conventionally established symbol systems at work, like the analogous claim regarding representation, prompt questions on the necessity, for Goodman, to recognize naturalistic constraints on what can be exemplified, or expressed, or represented by what.
More importantly, when we examine specific cases, it becomes unclear whether the distinction between exemplification in general and expression in particular has been well drawn. Certainly, works of art have significant features that they simply possess, without also exemplifying them. A work of art may have to be recognized as, e.
It could be the case that endowing a work with an exemplification function could, at once, endow the work with the feature it exemplifies, a suggestion that seems especially apt to works of art cf. Whether something like that could be explained, as Goodman would want it, with no reference to either the intentions of artists or, more generally, the context of artistic production remains to be seen. Yet, of course, artists may succeed, it seems, at securing reference and endowing their works with artistically relevant features within, and thanks to, a specific context of production.
Appeal to the rules of a system may not be sufficient to explain how reference is indeed secured. That is, and going back to an issue mentioned above, the rules of a system may never be granular enough to offer a full explanation of how a work of art exemplifies some of its features but not others, or is successfully made to possess, metaphorically, features it expresses.
Given the syntactic and semantic characteristics of notational systems, the different art forms can be arranged on a spectrum made of the sorts of systems that stand between a pure notation—where there is perfect preservation of identity between replicas or performances of the work—and fully dense pictorial systems—where every work is an original. Only the actual canvas that was painted by Raphael in counts as the Madonna del Granduca , and only those prints that come from the original plate used by Rembrandt for his Self-Portrait with a Velvet Cap with Plume count as the originals of that work—anything else is a copy, however apparently indistinguishable from the original.
Art forms like music, dance, etc. As the examples above already illustrate, the distinction between autographic and allographic arts is not the same as that between arts that are singular and those that are multiple. Etching, for instance, is still autographic although multiple. Incidentally, this could allow Goodman to account for the interesting hypothesis, advanced by Gregory Currie , of superxerox machines capable of reproducing paintings in a molecule-by-molecule faithful way.
Such a cloning technique, Goodman could say, would transform the art of painting from singular to multiple, and yet without changing it from autographic to allographic. A painting which is autographic is accessible once completed, while a theatrical play allographic requires a performance. Yet, allographic arts, too, can be one-stage, e. More relevantly, Goodman articulates his theory of work identity by addressing whether a given art form allows for a notational system, i. Advanced at first as a tentative approach, and indeed, throughout presented as open to revisions, the proposal is developed somewhat systematically, with the clear intent of showing its potential for becoming a general and comprehensive theory.
Music, painting, literature, theater, dance, and architecture are all addressed with respect to the question of their relationships with the syntactic and semantic requirements of a notation. By the same token, the questions are not asked hypothetically or just as a mental exercise—in that sense, trivial notations could be devised for any art form Goodman, Elgin , Chap.
Rather, the questions are addressed with reference to the systems of notations already existing, when they do, and, more generally, with awareness of the actual history of the various art forms. Naturally, music and painting and with the latter, of course, sculpture end up standing on opposite sides of the spectrum, the first being allographic and allowing for a notation, the second autographic and not admitting of any notation compatible with practice. Even one small mistake on the part of the performer, say, in replacing one note for another, is sufficient to declare that, technically, a different work has been performed.
On the other hand, other, important aspects of standard musical notation are not in a notational system: indications of tempo, for instance, as well as the convention of letting the performer choose the cadenza, give great latitude to the performer. Furthermore, the history of an art form may include as music did an autographic stage, which only at a later time made room for the establishment of a notation, on the grounds of previous practice.
While dance does not yet have a standard notation, Goodman finds the tentative notation proposed by Rudolf Laban which indeed Laban proposed for movement in general to be a good candidate for a notational system, indeed one with fewer departures from notationality than standard musical notation. And here is one of the many areas where the results of an aesthetic investigation, however tentative, may be relevant to other areas of human knowledge and activity. The conclusion that Goodman reaches about architecture is also a good indicator of the importance placed, in his analysis, on the actual history of an art form.
It is important to emphasize how that does not mean that a classification of paintings according to a notational system could not be found, or even found easily: a library-type classification for paintings for instance. What it does mean, however, is that, given the history of the medium and of the ways of classifying works of painting, a library-type notation would be incompatible with established artistic practice.
The painting itself or, in the case of etching, only the prints using the original plate counts or count as the work. And what is true of painting is true of the sketches that precede the painting. The sketch itself is a work of art, and one that is autographic, in spite of its being used as a guide to the production of the final work Goodman , — With a novel, poem, or the script used for a play or movie, the text is a character in a notational scheme.
However, what counts as a work in such art forms is different. In theater or drama , a work is a set of performances compliant with what established in the script. Even in the later work, Reconceptions , Goodman reemphasizes this claim a, While endorsing pluralism with regard to the number of correct interpretations i. Incidentally, the contrast between theater and the literature more narrowly conceived i. Instead, for the most part contemporary discussion has concentrated on individual art forms and problematic examples.
Within the ontology of music, the claim for which the score fully, and solely, individuates the work has received the most attention. Of the two claims, that compliance with a score is necessary for a performance to be considered a bona fide instance of a musical work has been received with way more controversy than the one for which full compliance is sufficient to declare a performance a legitimate work instance.
The former claim may seem naturally problematic. First of all, it clearly conflicts with actual practice. Of course, as mentioned, Goodman does not aim at reforming ordinary usage. Dodd only in the sense that it separates ontological claims from actual artistic and art critical practices, thus allowing for even radical departures from such practices—yet, again, without advocating their modification.
Indeed, and further, there seems to be a conceptual problem in making sense of the claim on brilliant and yet wrong performances. The ontological claim on what individuates an artwork—hence, on what counts as a bona fide instance or performance of a work—is in itself independent of claims, in themselves not even philosophical, on what makes a musical piece recognizably similar or virtually identical to another.
Further, recognizability, here, may interestingly intersect with symbolization. After all, Goodman is keenly interested in the symbolic relations between works of art including, e. A performance that aims, say, at an especially intense and driven rendering of a piece and, as a consequence of that, includes, perhaps unavoidably, departures from the prescribed notes, may be considered a brilliant rendering of such a piece by virtue of reference to, including exemplication of, the piece as individuated by the original score, although, ontologically, be considered—as it should be, Goodman would insist—an instance of a distinct work.
What Goodman says, e. After all, in art forms like music written according to traditional Western notation, which have developed a notation, we are legitimately interested in the different performances of a work of art—and in the best ones among them—precisely because what defines them as performances of a work is not the same as the set of aesthetic properties the work has to offer. On the other hand, one might be suspicious of the degree of inclusiveness of aesthetic properties i.
Such a move would allow restricting the range of aesthetic properties a given artwork can comprise. Similarly, interpretations of a novel that were to run against what is compatible with a given historically located projection say, because anachronistic, or because incompatible with the genre a work is in could, then, be declared inadmissible, or admissible as interpretations of an identical text, yet one projected within a different context and effectively amounting to a different work.
The result is not just an explanation of the autographic nature of some arts and the allographic nature of others. It is a way more articulated account of the variety of ways in which notationality, when present, has authority in identifying artworks in the various arts, hence in differently determining the localization of what counts as the artwork. Hence, in addition to what mentioned above about poetry and cinema, it is worth wondering what Goodman could say of certain forms of installation and conceptual art.
Pillow ? Whatever the answer to the questions arising in individual cases, the Goodmanian framework, with all its limits and underdeveloped areas, can clearly offer a range of possibilities and conceptual intersections. An issue closely related to the ontological question of the identity of the work of art in the various art forms—indeed the very issue that Goodman uses, in Languages of Art , to introduce his theory of notation—is that of the importance of authenticity in art and of the aesthetic relevance of being a forgery.
The brief answer is that authenticity matters only where there is no notationality. Hence, for instance, it makes no difference whether a musical piece is performed from the original score or from a copy congruent with that, since the score is in a notational scheme. Yet it does matter whether one is presented with an original Rembrandt or with a copy of it, since paintings are analogs, symbols in syntactically dense systems. With regard to two visually indiscernible paintings, an original and a copy, Goodman addresses the question whether there is any aesthetic difference between the two pictures , 99— Notice that, if there is a difference, it must not depend on what one can visually discern at the present time, for ex hypothesis , there is no such visual difference that can currently be detected.
It must be noticed, then, that this claim is all within a theory of perception and, while claiming that non-perceptible features are relevant to perception, hence are relevant to aesthetic experience, it does not claim that non-perceptible features as such are relevant to aesthetic experience.
The aims of art are the aims of symbolic activity in general, and they have to do with understanding. Understanding is, for Goodman, a broader concept than knowledge, one that is not bound by literal truth, and that is thus applicable also to the literally false and to what admits of no truth value: metaphors and paintings for example.
Artistic symbols, as symbols in general, are to be judged for the classifications they bring about, for how novel and insightful those categorizations are, for how they change our perception of the world and relations to it. Goodman proposes no definition of art nor of what makes an experience aesthetic. In Languages of Art , they were tentatively presented as conjunctively sufficient and disjunctively necessary for an experience to be aesthetic.
There Goodman indicated four of such symptoms: syntactic density , semantic density , syntactic repleteness , and exemplificationality , — In Ways of Worldmaking , the list is enriched by a fifth element: multiple and complex reference Goodman a, 67— In his later contribution that those are only symptoms seems to be taken even more literally: they are clues that indicate but do not guarantee the presence of a work of art; and artistic status is possible even without them.
The same features that are characteristic, for instance, of numerical calculation—e. Goodman links artistic status to the performance of certain symbolic functions in certain ways. Yet, his emphasis on the importance of asking when art is rather than what art is should be seen as anti-essentialist claim with respect to art: there is no one property or set of properties, not even a function or set of functions, that are distinctive of art objects.
On the other hand, that emphasis should not be taken to suggest that artworks can slip in and out of artistic status just on the grounds of use. Certainly, Goodman is committed to claiming that something can be a work of art at one time and not another a, Goodman emphasizes the cognitive role of emotions in the apprehension of a work of art , In art, he emphasizes, feeling emotions, whether positive or negative, pleasant or unpleasant, is a way to perceive the work and the world through the work.
Feeling melancholy when listening to a piece of music, for instance, may be a way to perceive musical features of the work, as well as to perceive the world in terms of them. Hence, the emotions serve the understanding. For the sort of phenomena mentioned in the latter claim may very well be best explained by cognitive theories that consider mental simulation and other forms of mimicry central to certain imaginative activities as well as to memory. Art has a general importance to the knowledge enterprise, which is addressed with special clarity in Ways of Worldmaking.
That is, Goodman is a constructivist and a relativist. His relativism, however, is not one of laissez-faire: versions can be distinguished between right and wrong, and indeed attempts to construct a world may fail.
The Structure of Appearance | Nelson Goodman | Springer
For the worlds that Goodman posits are not possible worlds brought about by possible descriptions of the world. Rather, when the versions are right, they are all part of the actual world. For such metaphysical and epistemological approach to include the arts amongst the means to construct worlds, one needs only to add that versions of the world include non-verbal versions and non-literal versions as well. Art forms that do not use language, such as painting or music or architecture, can offer ways of perceiving and understanding the world—indeed ways to construct a world—allowing us, for instance, to see and hear and perceive things in new and refreshing ways.
Works of art can participate in worldmaking precisely because they have symbolic functions a, Visiting a museum can change our perception of the world, making us notice new aspects of reality and allowing us to encounter a different reality.
Read From Logic To Art Themes From Nelson Goodman
Literal denotation, metaphorical denotation, as well as exemplification and expression, can all contribute to the construction of a world. And artworks, by exemplifying shapes, colors, emotional patterns, etc. This is not just true in the sense that seeing a painting may change our way of seeing the world. Works of art may have effects that go beyond their medium, and hence music may affect seeing, painting affect hearing, and so on. Biographical Sketch 2. Classifying and Constructing Worlds 3.
Zitate pro Jahr
Primary Works in Aesthetics B. From Languages of Art to Reconceptions : New Looks at Aesthetic Issues The rich and systematic general analysis of modes of reference and of types of symbol systems presented in Languages of Art allows Goodman to address fundamental questions in the philosophy of art: on the nature of the different art forms and the symbolic functions that are central to them; on questions of ontology and the importance of authenticity; on the distinction between artistic and non-artistic forms of symbolization; and on the role of artistic value.
Bibliography A. Primary Works in Aesthetics A. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Conceptual design by Nelson Goodman. Secondary Works B. Levinson, Jerrold, Professor Geoffrey Hellman's introduction gives a sustained analysis and appreciation of the major themes and the thrust of the book, as well as an account of the ways in which many of Goodman's problems and projects have been picked up and developed by others. Hellman also suggests how The Structure of Appearance introduces issues which Goodman later continues in his essays and in the Languages of Art.
What we can only hope to suggest, in this note, is the b. One may say of Nelson Goodman that his bite is worse than his bark. Behind what appears as a cool and methodical analysis of the conditions of the construction of systems, there lurks a radical and disturbing thesis: that the world is, in itself, no more one way than another, nor are we.
Scientific method thus intersects the philosophy of language. On this basis, Goodman develops a sophisticated nominalism a view stressing the power of language to determine meaning , which remains solidly within the analytic tradition. His philosophy of language also develops themes of construction and simplicity.
Goodman's later work contains an original treatment of representation. In asking how an original can be represented in perception, language, or art, he argues that there is no straightforward relation between the original and its representation. Understanding a photograph as a representation, for example, is neither simple nor intuitive. Representations, to be understood as such, must be interpreted instead within a network of more or less conventional rules.
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences. Nelson Goodman , Catherine Z. The book continues Goodman's argument against one traditional mode of philosophizing which privileges the notions of 'truth' and 'knowledge'.